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It is a great honor for me to be invited to address this confer-
ence and to share my perspective as the General Counsel of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services on the issues that you are 
discussing today. 
Not having any particular personal or institutional expertise in 
intellectual property law, the portion of the theme of today’s confer-
ence that I will address is the delicate balance between the FDA’s 
regulations and approval processes, and public health and drug ac-
cess concerns.  The question that is the theme of today’s conference 
is particularly timely for discussion at a legal conference.  In the last 
few months, two federal court decisions have raised questions about 
the FDA’s ability to serve as a gatekeeper over access to drugs in the 
market as well as to the propriety of the FDA’s role in making deter-
minations that limit the availability of new drugs to patients. 
The first case to which I am referring, of course, is the Abigail Al-
liance decision.1  As I am sure you are aware, in Abigail Alliance the 
D.C. Circuit announced a fundamental un-enumerated right, as part 
of substantive due process, “of a mentally competent, terminally ill 
adult patient to access potentially life-saving post-Phase I investiga-
tional new drugs, upon a doctor’s advice”—that is, a constitutional 
right to drugs that the FDA has determined are safe enough to pro-
ceed to Phase II clinical trials but that are unapproved and that a 
doctor concludes are in the patient’s interests. 
I confess that when I first read the decision, my immediate 
thought was that it had been too long since I had taken Constitu-
 ∗ General Counsel, United States Department of Health and Human Services. 
 1 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 
445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  Since this address was written, the D.C. Circuit issued 
its en banc decision affirming the District Court judgment dismissing the Abigail Al-
liance’s claims.  Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Es-
chenbach, No. 04-5350, 2007 WL 2238914 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2007). 
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tional Law in law school, because I didn’t recall reading the phrase 
“post-Phase I clinical trials” in the Constitution, nor, come to think of 
it, any mention of the FDA (which I’m sure was a drafting oversight 
by our Framers). 
In fairness, however, one has to acknowledge that the decision 
by the majority in Abigail Alliance appeals—even if it doesn’t expressly 
invoke—at least superficially, to principles that lie at the core of the 
political philosophy of our founding.  Certainly, we all know that 
Hobbes and Locke and other similar social contractarians argued 
that people have a natural right of self-preservation.  Locke went so 
far as to call self-preservation a “duty owed to God.”  And the drafters 
of our Declaration of Independence proclaimed that when “govern-
ment becomes destructive” of these ends it is the right of a people to 
alter or abolish their government.  The charge that limiting access to 
drugs outside of clinical trials to those drugs that have been approved 
by the FDA is violative of a fundamental right of self-preservation is, 
to say the least, an explosive one to make. 
Upon closer examination, however, I would argue that the rea-
soning of the panel majority in Abigail Alliance, which closely follows 
the arguments made by the Alliance in that case, is philosophically 
incoherent.  The Abigail Alliance court based its analysis on two main 
prongs: the relatively minimal history of drug regulation prior to the 
twentieth century (which, incidentally, I believe is somewhat exagger-
ated), and the common law tradition which recognized a right to act 
in self-defense.  The panel, however, stopped short of the conclusion 
that one might have thought would have logically followed from its 
premises: that individuals battling potentially terminal illnesses have a 
right to make their own decision about whether to take drugs that 
may or may not be effective and that might or might not harm them.  
Instead, the panel held only that terminally ill individuals had a “fun-
damental right” to access drugs that both the FDA has determined 
are safe enough to proceed to Phase II clinical trials and that the pa-
tients’ doctors had recommended.  In other words, the Court ac-
cepted that the FDA may—notwithstanding statements in the opinion 
suggesting that the decision to take a drug that might save a patient is 
an area of personal autonomy that historically has been free of gov-
ernmental regulation—bar access to unapproved drugs that the FDA 
deems not sufficiently safe. 
But what, one may ask, is the principled constitutional distinc-
tion at work here?  Once one accepts the principle that the FDA may 
constitutionally serve as a gatekeeper and prohibit provision of drugs 
that the FDA determines are not safe enough, what constitutional 
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significance is there to the difference between the standards of safety 
that the FDA applies in making determinations whether the drug may 
proceed to Phase II trials, versus Phase III trials, versus the ultimate 
drug approval decision?  For that matter, why condition the exercise 
of this alleged fundamental right on a doctor’s approval?  Fundamen-
tal rights are generally understood to be rights to act free of govern-
ment interference.  Defining the very right by reference to an FDA 
regulatory scheme makes little sense. 
For these reasons, although the Abigail Alliance panel, as well as 
the plaintiffs, insisted they were applying a fundamental rights analy-
sis, it seems far more coherent to understand the analysis in Abigail 
Alliance as a form of very heightened rational basis or “arbitrary and 
capricious” review.  In effect, the plaintiffs and the panel majority ar-
gued that it is irrational to have a regulatory scheme in which the 
FDA makes a determination that a drug is safe enough to be adminis-
tered in Phase II clinical trials, yet to deny access to those same drugs 
to terminally ill persons who do not qualify or were unable to obtain 
a spot in the trial. 
But under rationality review, this challenge must surely fail as 
well.  Where there exist strong competing rationales pointing in dif-
ferent directions, the work of reconciling those competing policies 
when it comes to the regulation of commercial conduct is surely the 
job of regulators, not judges.  Here, the FDA has strong interests in 
limiting clinical access to drugs that have not yet completed the clini-
cal trial process, and those interests extend well beyond the paternal-
istic one of trying to protect the safety of patients.  For example, pa-
tients who agree to participate in a clinical trial have approximately 
only a fifty percent chance of actually being administered the drug 
being tested; the remainder get either a placebo or an alternative 
treatment.  Why would patients agree to participate in clinical trials if 
they could obtain drugs outside the clinical trial without that fifty 
percent risk? 
Having said all this, there is much less here than meets the eye, 
in at least two respects.  First, the FDA already has in place a proce-
dure, now codified in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, by which 
terminally ill patients who wish access to experimental drugs outside 
the context of a clinical trial may obtain access to such drugs.  In par-
ticular, section 561 of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) per-
mits individual patients to obtain access to investigational drugs or 
devices if (1) their physician determines that there is no comparable 
or satisfactory alternative therapy for the serious disease and that the 
risks of the investigational drug or device are comparable to the risks 
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of the disease or condition; and (2) the FDA determines that there is 
sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to support the use and 
that the use will not interfere with completion of clinical trials, and 
the sponsor submits an appropriate protocol.  Section 561 further au-
thorizes widespread access to investigational drugs where the FDA 
makes findings that the sponsor is proceeding with clinical trials and 
is actively pursuing marketing approval.  With respect to individual 
patient requests for access to unapproved therapies for terminal or 
life-threatening conditions that are unresponsive to available therapy, 
the FDA has been quite permissive in its approvals.  And while the 
FDA’s rules prohibit manufacturers from charging such patients 
more than regulatorily defined “direct costs,” that restriction is a per-
fectly reasonable way of both protecting desperate consumers and 
ensuring that manufacturers retain the incentive to pursue approval 
through the clinical trial process. 
Second, there is of course no guarantee that removal of the pro-
hibition of a manufacturer’s supplying drugs outside the clinical trial 
process would in fact result in the manufacturer actually making the 
drugs available.  This is a point to which I will return later. 
The second recent court case, Medical Center Pharmacy v. Gonza-
les,2 currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, squarely raises issues re-
lating to the balancing of FDA regulation and access, challenging the 
FDA’s authority to subject drug compounding to the Act’s require-
ments relating to approval of “new drugs.” 
Drug compounding refers to the process by which a pharmacist 
or doctor combines, mixes, or alters ingredients to create a medica-
tion tailored to the needs of an individual patient.  Compounding is 
typically used to prepare medications that are not commercially avail-
able, such as medication for a patient who is allergic to an ingredient 
in a mass-produced product.  It is a traditional component of the 
practice of pharmacy.  Although with the rise of modern manufactur-
ing practices for drugs pharmacy compounding is less widespread, it 
is still a component of the practice of pharmacy and is taught as part 
of the standard curriculum at most pharmacy schools. 
The FDCA, however, requires that the FDA specifically approve 
every “new drug” introduced into interstate commerce.  The FDCA 
defines the term “new drug” as any drug the composition of which is 
not generally recognized as safe and effective, and there is little 
doubt that compounded drugs clearly fall within this definition and 
are therefore subject to the FDA’s jurisdiction.  However, were the 
 2 451 F. Supp.2d 854 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
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FDA to require that every compounded drug be reviewed for safety 
and effectiveness, the practice of compounding would be effectively 
shut down.  For that reason, the FDA traditionally left regulation of 
compounding to the states.  Pharmacists continued to prepare com-
pounded drugs for specific patients without applying for FDA ap-
proval of those drugs. 
In the early 1990s, however, the FDA became concerned that 
some pharmacists were engaged in large-scale manufacturing under 
the guise of compounding, thereby avoiding the FDCA’s new drug 
requirements.  In 1992, in response to this concern, the FDA issued a 
Compliance Policy Guide (CPG) which announced that the FDA 
would continue to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to 
traditional drug compounding.  However, if the manufacturer’s 
compounding activities were akin to drug manufacturing, the FDA 
would consider enforcement actions. 
The FDA’s policy was largely codified by Congress in the Food 
and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), 
which contained a statutory exemption for certain drug compound-
ing activities.3  The FDAMA provisions permitted compounding by a 
licensed pharmacist or physician in response to a valid prescription 
for an identified individual patient, or, if prepared before the receipt 
of such a prescription, in “limited quantities” only.  The statute also 
prohibited pharmacies from soliciting prescriptions and from adver-
tising the availability of specific compounded drugs.  Pharmacists 
could advertise their compounding services generally, but not specific 
compounded drugs. 
These speech restrictions were challenged by a group of phar-
macists on First Amendment grounds in Thompson v. Western States 
Medical Center.4  The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which 
held that the speech provisions in FDAMA were not narrowly tailored 
to promote the government’s objectives, and thus unconstitutionally 
restricted the speech rights of pharmacists.  Interestingly, in that liti-
gation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that not only were 
the speech restrictions unconstitutional, but that they could not be 
severed from the other provisions of the law relating to compound-
ing.  Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, the entire com-
pounding section of the statute was invalid.  That issue was never ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, and thus the Supreme Court did not 
rule on severability. 
 3 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2000). 
 4 535 U.S. 357 (2002), aff’g W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
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Following the Western States litigation, the FDA has taken the po-
sition that the FDAMA provisions relating to compounding are inva-
lid, and has issued a revised compliance policy guide that sets forth 
the circumstances under which the FDA will exercise its enforcement 
discretion to permit compounding of specific drugs.  The FDA’s ap-
proach is again based on balancing access and safety—permitting 
compounding in limited quantities in response to a specific, valid 
prescription from a physician.  But when the volume or other circum-
stances of compounding suggest that the pharmacy is actually acting 
as a drug manufacturer, the FDA will consider enforcement actions. 
In particular, the FDA’s CPG defines traditional compounding, 
which the FDA leaves for the states to regulate, as the “extemporane-
ous[] compound[ing] and manipulation of reasonable quantities of 
human drugs upon receipt of a valid prescription for an individually 
identified patient from a licensed practitioner.”5  When considering 
potential enforcement actions over drug compounding, the FDA has 
stated it would take into account the following: whether the com-
pounding was being conducted with drugs that were withdrawn or 
removed from the market for safety reasons; whether compounding 
created finished drugs from bulk active ingredients that were not 
components of approved drugs; whether the compounding used 
commercial scale manufacturing or testing equipment, and similar 
indicia of potential harms.  In short, we are fully aware that there are 
many beneficial instances of compounding, and that it would be bad 
policy to prohibit all forms of compounding.  The FDA is committed 
to making sure that its enforcement guidance is clear enough to 
avoid deterring beneficial conduct, while at the same time making 
sure that abusive practices involving bulk compounding remain sub-
ject to its enforcement. 
The district court’s decision in Medical Center Pharmacy throws 
much of this conceptual framework into doubt, although the district 
court’s injunction did not permit wide-scale compounding in bulk.  
The district court concluded that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding, the majority of section 503A remains valid, and that the 
FDCA implicitly excludes compounded drugs from the definition of 
“new drugs.”  While reasonable people might disagree on the sever-
ability issue decided by the Ninth Circuit, I believe that section 503A 
actually confirms that Congress intended compounded drugs to qual-
ify as “new drugs,” because otherwise its express exemption of drugs 
that are compounded individually under the conditions specified in 
 5 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDES MANUAL § 460.200 
(2002), http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/cpg/cpgdrg/cpg460-200.html.
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section 503A from the definition of new drug would have been un-
necessary.  This case is now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, and we 
hope that the Fifth Circuit will place the task of balancing the com-
peting risks and benefits of compounding back at the FDA—where it 
belongs. 
Perhaps the most fundamental and visible example of the bal-
ance of government regulation and access is the continuing debate 
over the speed of drug approval by the FDA and the availability of re-
sources for that purpose.  Since 1962, the FDCA has required the 
FDA to assess the safety and effectiveness of every new drug before it 
may lawfully be distributed in interstate commerce.  The statute re-
quires manufacturers to provide the FDA with extensive data demon-
strating that the drug is safe and effective and that the product can be 
consistently produced within precise specifications.  The FDA is re-
quired to review all of the data submitted by the manufacturer and 
determine whether the product meets the statutory standards for ap-
proval.  This takes time and resources.  For that reason, there has 
long been controversy surrounding the length of the FDA’s review 
and the resources available to the agency to review applications. 
In 1992, for the first time, Congress authorized the FDA to col-
lect fees from drug companies to fund drug reviews.  The Prescrip-
tion Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA)6 established a system whereby 
manufacturers were required to pay significant fees to the FDA for 
the review of both initial applications for the approval of a new drug 
and subsequent supplemental applications, such as an application for 
an already approved drug to be approved for use in a new indication.  
PDUFA was authorized by Congress for five years, and it has been re-
authorized twice—in 1997, then again in 2002.  PDUFA is up for re-
authorization this year, and once again, the debate has centered on 
FDA resources, review times for drug applications, and drug safety. 
When PDUFA was first enacted in 1992, the focus was speeding 
up the review time for drugs.  At that time, many felt that the FDA 
was not approving new medications fast enough, particularly for dis-
eases such as AIDS and cancer.  Accordingly, under the original en-
actment of PDUFA and subsequent reauthorizations, PDUFA fees 
were meant to facilitate and speed drug reviews.  Under the law, the 
FDA must render a decision on a new drug application within ten 
months.  The FDA can request additional data or take other actions 
to extend the clock on action dates, but generally speaking, PDUFA 
has had the effect of dramatically shortening review times for drugs.  
 6 P.L. 102-571, 106 Stat 4491 (1992). 
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In addition, PDUFA mandated that the FDA hire additional staff 
dedicated to reviewing applications. 
Under current law, PDUFA fees can be dedicated to monitoring 
safety issues only for the first three years following approval of a drug.  
Clearly, the Congresses that enacted PDUFAs I to III felt that the FDA 
was taking too long and erecting too many hurdles to drug availabil-
ity.  Today, the focus is somewhat different.  Although facilitating ef-
ficient reviews of new drug applications remains a priority, there is a 
great deal more attention given to drug safety, and especially to the 
resources available to the FDA to engage in post-approval surveil-
lance.  Think of Vioxx or Ketek.  Accordingly, as part of the discus-
sion over the reauthorization of PDUFA this year, the FDA has pro-
posed that the three-year restriction on use of PDUFA fees for drug 
safety monitoring be lifted, and that a significant portion of PDUFA 
fees be dedicated to post-market drug safety initiatives. 
PDUFA, therefore, illustrates the careful balance that the FDA 
and Congress must strike—on one hand, providing speedy access to 
needed medications, but on the other hand, ensuring the continued 
safety of the U.S. drug supply.  How the FDA and Congress strike that 
balance can shift over time, and we are currently seeing the pendu-
lum swing towards drug safety. 
Of course, no discussion of FDA regulation and drug access 
would be complete without some mention of the very public debate 
over drug reimportation.  That debate goes directly to the question of 
the appropriate level of government regulation to balance competing 
goals—ensuring the safety of the drug supply and giving consumers 
greater access to affordable medications.  The disparity of drug costs 
in the United States compared to other countries has led many to as-
sert that the government should permit consumers to freely import 
drugs from other countries, Canada in particular. 
Unfortunately, the debate over re-importation, in my opinion, 
has been marred by confusion of terms and misapprehension of the 
current legal requirements.  Individuals debating the issue often talk 
past each other, because they use the same terms to mean very differ-
ent things. 
Of the various types of conduct to which one might refer, only 
one is strictly speaking re-importation, which is when a U.S.-
manufactured drug, approved for sale in the U.S., is exported abroad 
and then re-imported back to this country.  That is legal today, so 
long as it is the original manufacturer who does the re-importation.  
But that process does not result in cheaper drugs, and is not what 
most people mean when they use the phrase “re-importation.”  It is of 
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course also legal for persons to import (not re-import) FDA-approved 
drugs made for the U.S. market in FDA-inspected foreign facilities—
but again, this process doesn’t result in access to cheap foreign 
prices. 
Two main categories of importation are currently illegal.  One is 
the importation of unapproved drugs produced in facilities that the 
FDA has not inspected at all.  The second, and perhaps the one that 
has garnered the most attention on the part of advocates of liberaliz-
ing importation rules, involves foreign versions of drugs that are 
manufactured in the same facility (although often on a different pro-
duction line), and by the same manufacturer, as the FDA-approved 
drug. 
Proponents of liberalizing importation of this latter category of 
drugs from Canada helped secure passage of section 804 of the 
FDCA.  That section, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 384, would allow drug 
wholesalers and pharmacists to import prescription drugs from Can-
ada under certain circumstances.  However, that section of the statute 
is effective only if the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
certifies to Congress that the section’s implementation will “pose no 
additional risk to the public’s health and safety” and will “result in a 
significant reduction in the cost of covered products to the American 
consumer.”  To date, no HHS Secretary, going back to the Clinton 
Administration, has made such a finding. 
Section 804, however, presents something of a legal conundrum.  
Even if a Secretary were to make the required finding, section 804 
requires that importation only be permitted in accordance with regu-
lations that “require safeguards” that each imported drug comply 
with section 505 of the Act (requiring FDA approval of the drugs as 
safe and efficacious) as well as with sections 501 and 502, which re-
spectively bar drugs that are adulterated and misbranded.  Enforce-
ment of this requirement would virtually make a null set of drugs that 
could lawfully be imported from Canada, even if the Secretary were 
able to make the requisite certification.  Drugs manufactured in Can-
ada for the Canadian (or another foreign country’s) market would 
not be packaged with U.S.-approved labeling, and would often not be 
produced on the FDA-approved and inspected manufacturing lines.  
Such drugs will, therefore, not be approved under section 505 (which 
requires approval of the labeling and production facilities), they will 
almost always be misbranded, and the lack of FDA inspections would 
make it impossible for the FDA to create safeguards that the drugs 
are not adulterated as defined by law.  Although policy debaters often 
talk about modifying U.S. policy to allow importation of foreign ver-
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sions of “FDA-approved” drugs, drugs manufactured for foreign mar-
kets are almost necessarily not FDA-approved, and the FDA cannot 
provide assurances as to their safety. 
Conventional wisdom holds that FDA regulation has an inverse 
relationship with access to drugs—greater regulation reduces the 
availability and access to drugs.  Up to now, I have focused on aspects 
of the U.S. regulatory system that might be consistent with that prem-
ise.  But there is one very important context in which the conven-
tional wisdom does not always hold, and in which FDA regulation 
may serve to increase access to drugs. 
The FDA is not the only entity that establishes requirements per-
taining to the design and labeling of drugs.  The common law tort 
regime, usually implemented by lay juries, imposes its own form of af-
ter the fact “review” of the safety of drugs and of the accuracy of la-
bels.  Although prior Supreme Court decisions questioned this, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bates7 firmly recognized that 
awards under the common law impose “requirements” on manufac-
turers, as that term is used in many express preemption clauses.  It is 
often argued that the threat of large damage awards diminishes the 
willingness of manufacturers to introduce certain categories of drugs 
to the market and increases the prices of those drugs that are intro-
duced. 
By removing the threat of inconsistent and burdensome state 
regulatory requirements that might otherwise apply to drugs, pre-
emption works to increase access to prescription drugs.  Were states 
to impose their own requirements on drugs, manufacturers would be 
required to comply with fifty different regulatory systems.  This could 
mean substantially different versions of the labeling to be distributed 
with drugs, or even different methods of manufacturing the product 
in order to comply with state requirements.  Were this to happen, 
manufacturers would face potentially prohibitive costs, and, in the ex-
treme, could face a situation where they could not comply with both 
state and federal law.  By operation of the preemption doctrine, the 
FDA’s regulatory requirements serve to remove inconsistent state re-
quirements and establish a uniform national standard, thereby en-
hancing the availability and access of these products. 
But the preemptive effect of FDA regulation is directly corre-
lated to its intrusiveness.  Where the FDA regulatory process includes 
detailed review and approval of specific designs and particular word-
ing on labels, a process that is deliberate, methodical and time-
 7 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
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consuming, courts have generally agreed that contrary state law tort 
verdicts are preempted.  But where the FDA process has been stream-
lined, preemption is far less likely to be found.  A stark demonstra-
tion of this is in the medical device context.  In Medtronic v. Lohr,8 the 
Supreme Court held that the streamlined “substantial equivalence” 
501k determination that the FDA makes in approving devices did not 
create federal requirements of preemptive effect.  Yet, even after 
Lohr, six of the seven Circuits that have considered the question have 
concluded that the slower but much more rigorous pre-market ap-
proval process for devices did preempt state law defective design and 
misleading labeling claims.9  This is thus one area where increased 
FDA regulation can actually lead to greater access to more affordable 
therapies. 
This last point brings us back full circle to Abigail Alliance.  Even 
removal of the prohibition on access to experimental drugs would 
not impose any requirement that manufacturers actually make such 
experimental drugs available to patients.  In fact, there is substantial 
reason to believe that manufacturers might not make their drugs 
available to patients outside the confines of clinical trials.  Experi-
mental unapproved drugs, by definition, have not been found safe 
and effective by the FDA, and thus the FDCA would not generally 
preempt tort claims against manufacturers by individuals injured by 
these drugs.  Although manufacturers would undoubtedly try to limit 
sales to those who sign express and broad releases, their exposure in 
tort might very well have limited the practical effect the Abigail Alli-
ance decision would have had. 
 8 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 9 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve this cir-
cuit split.  See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 75 
U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. June 25, 2007) (No. 06-179). 
